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ABSTRACT 
This study is used to determine whether Audit Quality has any significant impact on and relationship with 
Market Value per Share of companies in Nigeria. Archival data were extracted from annual reports of 57 
companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) between 2006 and 2011. Audit Quality was estimated 
using Audit Firm Size, Audit Fees, Auditor Tenure and Audit Client Importance. Market Price per Share (MPS) 
was derived directly from CSCS Cash – Craft.  Multiple regression analyses were conducted on the data. The 
results of the tests show that Audit Quality exerts significant influence on the MPS of quoted companies in 
Nigeria. In order to improve the quality of audit and minimize earnings manipulations by firms in Nigeria, we 
recommend that regulatory agencies -  professional  accountancy bodies, Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, 
the National Assembly, and  Securities and Exchange Commission should issue authoritative standard and  
framework for audit quality; companies should improve their earnings quality only through sales growth, cost 
control and cost reduction strategies; companies in Nigeria should present distinct statements of earnings quality 
while auditors should conduct earnings quality assessment and issue Integrated Audit Quality Assurance Report 
by adapting or adopting current best practices statutorily backed by earnings monitoring of companies in 
Nigeria.    
Keywords: Audit Quality, Earnings Reports, Financial Statements, Market price Per Share 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The value of a company’s shares has been shown to represent the value of its future earnings (Lev, 1989) 
and this explains why investors in a company have vital interest in the earnings reports. Consequently, company 
managers use certain strategies to deliberately manipulate company earnings in order to match a predetermined 
target and involve the planning and execution of certain activities that manipulate or smooth income, achieve 
high earnings level and sway the company’s stock price (Schipper, 1989; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Earnings 
manipulation activities may occur because managers have flexibility in making accounting or operating choices, 
or because managers are trying to convey private information to financial statement users. The conveyance of 
private information may be done to give stakeholders information not otherwise available so that they can adjust 
their expectations appropriately. Careful release of such information may have effect on the earnings and the 
share price for the company. If the information conveys significant value relevance to analysts and other users of 
financial statements, they may also adjust earnings estimates and share prices for other companies in the 
industry. This may positively influence the company revealing the information to experience positive impact on 
its share prices because it is perceived as having a higher quality of earnings.  
 The quality of reported earnings and the ability of audit quality to effectively constrain earnings 
misrepresentation and financial statement manipulations of companies across the world and Nigeria in particular, 
have become considerably questionable due to recent corporate accounting scandals (Badawi, 2008; Enofe, 
2010). Differences in Audit Quality result in variations in the credibility of auditors and the reliability of the 
earnings reports of companies. The recent corporate financial scandals pose a great challenge to the veracity, 
credibility, utility or value relevance of the audit function. Badawi (2008) reports a list of companies involved in 
cases of accounting scandals related to poor audit quality and earnings manipulations in the past decade. In 
Nigeria, corporate scandals include the cases of Cadbury Nigeria Plc and African Petroleum (AP) (Okolie and 
Agboma 2008); Savannah Bank and African International Bank (Odia, 2007); Wema Bank, Nampak, Finbank 
and Spring Bank (Adeyemi and Fagbemi, 2010); and more recently Intercontinental Bank Plc., Bank PHB; 
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Oceanic Bank Plc. and AfriBank Plc. These are known publicly reported cases that resulted in misleading 
financial reports. There is therefore a concern about the quality of accounting income and its relationship with 
the quality of the auditing process which has been observed to increase over time following the periodical 
clusters of business failures, frauds, and the litigations. The issue is whether these corporate collapses are not the 
outcome of poor audit quality and the inability of the audit function to arrest earnings misreporting and financial 
misstatements. 
Next to the focus on reported income statement, earnings analysts and investors may focus more on cash 
flows rather than the income statement of a company. As a result of corporate scandals analysts and stakeholders 
may have lost faith in accounting income-based measurements. Sufficient cash flows from operating activities 
are essential for these companies to remain profitable and viable in the future. Lack of cash flows could result in 
bankruptcy or for a company to turn into a takeover prey. Since investors use the cash flow statement to make 
investment decisions, highly motivated and intelligent management teams could be involved in manipulation of 
the real economic operations in order to create ways to influence the true picture of a company’s cash flow from 
operations (CFO). Certain reasons may account for executives’ greater willingness to engage in real earnings 
manipulation than through accruals management because accrual-based earnings misstatements are more likely 
to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny than real decisions that are related to production, product pricing, and 
expenditures on research and development or on advertising. 
Audit quality guidelines and standards provide codes of best practice that have been developed in different 
countries in order to curb the spate of vicious corporate collapses that has permeated the globe in the past 
decade. These codes largely represent the regulatory support that is meant to guarantee and sustain integrity of 
auditors’ reports in relation to corporate earnings and financial statements. Audit Quality (AQ) was first defined 
by DeAngelo (1981) as the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor discovers a breach in the 
client’s accounting system and reports the breach. The European Supreme Audit Institution (EUROSAI) 
extended the definition of Audit Quality in 2004 to include the degree to which a set of inherent characteristics 
of an audit fulfills requirements. Thus, the audit process assesses the probability of material misstatements and 
reduces the possibility of undetected misstatement to an appropriate assurance level (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986; Knechel, 2009). Audit Quality is recognized to influence financial reporting and strongly impact on 
investors’ confidence (Levitt, 1998). Conventionally, external auditors play critical and highly challenging roles 
in assuring the credibility of financial reports (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; Wallace, 1987).  
In the context of the challenges that confront the audit function, some prior studies (; Teoh & Wong, 1993; 
Heninger, 2001, Balsam, Krishnan & Yang, 2003) have attempted to establish a more or less distinct relationship 
between audit quality and share prices of a company, and have tried to show the impact of this relationship on 
the quality of the earnings reported by quoted companies in many countries. The above studies show that the 
quality of audit is expected to minimize the extent of a firm’s manipulations of reported income, influence 
investors response to earnings announcement and company share prices but majority of the studies has 
seemingly contradictory and inconsistent results.  
One position of this study is that audit quality as an outcome cannot be completely divorced from financial 
reporting quality. Many accounting scandals of the past decade have involved outright manipulation of 
accounting data through discretionary accruals including recording fictitious inventory and hiding liabilities even 
in the face of audited financial reports. Knechel (2009) posits that the companies that have involved in real 
accounting scandals along with a number of lesser known companies greatly involved in transactions where the 
accounting was technically correct but which served primarily to obfuscate the financial health of the 
organizations and the results of their operations. Wells (2005) reported that widespread manipulation of 
accounting information and income misstatements through discretionary accruals may be attributable to the 
pressure on corporate accountants, auditors and organizational managers to show profits. A common trend and 
threat among the companies that are involved in accounting and financial scandals are gross lack of integrity, 
character and transactions involving related parties (Geriesh, 2006, Enofe, 2010; Carey, 2006).  
Given the above scenario, the major problem of this study is to determine whether audit quality can 
significantly influence earnings response and market price per share of quoted companies in Nigeria. The study 
attempts to ascertain and establish whether there are significant relationships between Audit quality and Market 
Price per Share (MPS) of quoted companies in Nigeria.        
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section considers the concept and measurement of Audit Quality, Company Share Prices, Auditors’ 
Reports and corporate earnings. The section also deals with the theoretical framework relevant to this study. 
 
2.1 The Concept of Audit Quality (AQ) 
According to International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB, 2011), there has 
been a number of attempts to conceptualize “audit quality” in the past. However, none has resulted in a 
definition that has achieved universal recognition and acceptance. Audit quality is, in essence, a complex 
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and multi-faceted concept. The classic definition of audit quality that is cited by most audit researchers is that 
of DeAngelo (1981) which states that audit quality is the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor 
will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system and (b) report the breach. The definition 
highlights two important aspects of audit quality: (1) the competence of the audit firm that determines how likely 
it is that a misstatement will be detected and (2) the independence and objectivity of the auditor that determines 
what the auditor is likely to do about a detected misstatement. This definition has been quite useful to audit 
quality studies. The import of DeAngelo (1981) definition is that audit quality is a probability that an auditor will 
discover and truthfully report material errors, misrepresentations, or omissions in the client’s financial 
statements. Davidson, Stening and Wai (1984) simply posit that audit quality is the accuracy of auditor’s 
information reporting while Wallace (1987) shows that audit quality is a measure of the auditor’s ability to 
reduce noise and bias and meticulously improve accounting data. Davidson and Neu (1993) provide further that 
an audit quality definition is based on the auditor’s ability to detect and eliminate material misstatements and 
manipulations in reported net income.  
An important issue regarding the definition of audit quality is whether to distinguish audit firm quality from 
audit quality. Several studies (Clarkson, 2000; Colbert & Murray, 1998) do not make this distinction but instead 
use the concepts interchangeably. However, under certain conditions, audit firm quality and audit quality might 
be used interchangeably. According to the underlying assumptions in the DeAngelo’s (1981) definition, when an 
auditor provides only one level of quality of audit service, audit firm quality and audit quality may be akin to and 
correspond with each other. Meanwhile, Lam and Chang (1994) points out that audit quality should be defined 
on a service–by–service basis because an audit firm may not conduct its entire audit with the same level of 
quality.  
Perceived audit quality and actual audit quality also appear to be different concepts; Actual audit quality is 
unobservable and can be evaluated only after audits have been conducted. For instance, Palmrose (1988) 
measures actual audit quality using auditor’s litigation activities. Deis & Giroux (1992) analyzed quality control 
reviews to get a measure of actual audit quality in the public sector. Krishnan & Schauer’s (2000) measure of 
actual audit quality is based on how audited financial statements comply with certain specific GAAP reporting 
requirements. Deis & Giroux (1992) and Krishnan & Schauer’s (2000) both measure actual audit quality in the 
not-for-profit sector. However, results of studies in the not-for-profit sector might not be used to generalise for 
for-profit setting. It therefore suffers from generalization problems. 
Many studies test perceived audit quality due to the difficulty in measuring actual audit quality directly. 
DeAngelo (1981) analytically demonstrates that the larger the auditor, the less incentive the auditor has to 
behave opportunistically and the higher the perceived quality of the audit. Moreland (1995) investigates how 
SEC enforcement actions against Big 8 accounting firms affect their market perceived audit quality. Hogan 
(1997), documents that perception of higher audit quality is associated with less under pricing in the IPO market. 
It is difficult to measure actual audit quality but market perceptions of audit quality are more amenable to 
measurement.  
Audit quality is subject to many direct and indirect influences. In tandem with the stakeholder theory 
(Khan, 2006), perceptions of audit quality vary amongst stakeholders depending on their level of direct 
involvement in audits and on the perspective through which they assess audit quality. audit quality may 
be perceived from any of three fundamental perspectives: inputs, outputs, and context factors. Inputs to 
audit quality, apart from auditing standards, include the auditor’s personal attributes such as auditor skill 
and experience, ethical values and mindset. Another important input is the audit process including the 
soundness of the audit methodology, the effectiveness of the audit tools used, and the availability of 
adequate technical support geared toward supporting a high quality audit.  
Outputs of the audit are important influences on audit quality that are considered by stakeholders in 
their assessments of audit quality. Such influences include the auditor’s report (viewed as positively 
influencing audit quality if it clearly conveys the outcome of the audit), auditor communications to those 
charged with governance (on matters such as qualitative aspects of the entity’s financial reporting 
practices and deficiencies in internal control that can positively influence audit quality).  
More broadly, context factors that influence audit quality include sound corporate governance 
(especially if it creates a climate of transparency and ethical behaviour within the entity); Law and 
regulation (if it creates a framework within which the audit can be effectively conducted); regulatory 
oversight (if it establishes an effective regime for monitoring the quality of auditors’ work and effective 
dialogue between auditors and regulators); the quality of the applicable financial reporting framework 
(use of a financial reporting framework that does not promote robust and transparent disclosures may 
adversely affect audit quality as well as related external perceptions).  
2.1.1 Audit Quality Measurements 
As at date, there appears to be no agreed – upon metric for the measurement of audit quality construct 
(Gerayli, Yanesari and Ma’atoofi, 2011; Knechel, 2009 and IAASB, 2011). DeAngelo (1981) developed a two-
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dimensional definition of audit quality that set the standard for addressing the issue. First, a material 
misstatement must be detected, and second, the material misstatement must be reported. audit quality is 
influenced by many other factors as well. Since 1981, accounting studies have attempted to define, measure, and 
study multiple dimensions of audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) theorizes that larger firms perform better audits 
because they have a greater reputation at stake. In addition, because larger firms have more resources at their 
disposal, they can attract more highly skilled employees. Others have theorized that large auditors attract a fee 
premium because their greater wealth reduces clients’ exposures in litigation (the deep pockets theory). Others 
have theorized that there is no real audit quality difference, but the perception exists because large firms are well 
known and have gained a reputation for high quality. On the whole, the evidence is mixed, but it appears that 
there is some relationship between audit firm size and audit quality. What is unclear is whether this difference is 
actual or perceived. Based on DeAngelo’s (1981) reports, many other studies use auditor size (specifically Big8, 
Big6 or Big5 Vs non-Big8, non-Big6 or non-Big5) to differentiate audit quality levels (Copley, 1991; Clarkson 
& Simunic, 1994; Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Bauwhede, Willekens & Gaeremynck, 
2000; Zhou & Elder, 2001; Krishnan, 2003).  
Some studies have used audit fees as quality measures. Palmrose (1986) finds that there is a significant 
association between audit fees and auditor size measured by Big 8 vs non – Big 8 dichotomy. Copley (1991) 
finds that using audit fees as audit quality measure has greater power than Big 8 vs non – Big 8 dichotomy in 
explaining variation levels of local government disclosures. Colbert & Murray (1998) measure audit quality 
using the results of peer review. Schauer (2000) measures audit quality using client bid-ask spread, which is the 
difference between the ask price and bid price for a client company’s shares.  
Audit Independence may be defined as an auditor’s unbiased mental attitude in making decisions throughout 
the audit and financial reporting. Independence refers to the quality of being free from influence, persuasion or 
bias. In the absence of independence, the value of the audit service will be greatly impaired (Sweeney, 1994). An 
auditor’s lack of independence increases the possibility of being perceived as not being objective. This means 
that the auditor will not likely report a discovered breach. Prior studies contend that high fees paid by a company 
to its external auditor increase the economic bond between the auditor and the client and thus the fees may 
impair the auditor’s independence (Frankel, Johnson & Nelson, 2002; Li & Lin, 2005). The impaired 
independence results in poor audit quality and allows for greater EM (resulting in lower earnings quality). 
Auditor independence was not used in this study in order to avoid circularity because Audit Fee also indirectly 
measures independence 
Summing up, DeAngelo (1981); Palmrose (1988); Deis & Giroux (1992); Becker, et al (1998); Francis & 
Krishnan, (1999); Krishnan & Schauer (2000); Kim, Chung & Firth, (2003) and Krishnan, (2003) agree on audit 
quality as a function of audit firm size and demonstrate that larger (Big 8, Big 6, Big 5 or Big 4) audit firms 
possess greater capacity to measure Audit Quality. Wooten (2003) found that detecting material misstatements is 
influenced by how well the audit team performs the audit, which in turn is influenced by the quality control 
system and management resources of the audit firm.  
 
2.2 Company Share Prices, Auditors Reports and Corporate Earnings    
Financial reporting is essential for monitoring purposes. The external audit of company financial statements 
provides this monitoring and control. The principle of information disclosure is directed at ensuring the 
provision of relevant, reliable and sufficient information that enable stakeholders to take rational decisions. 
Investors, in particular require audited financial reports to make investments decision and to assess the risk and 
returns expectations on their investments. Audit specifically provides shareholders and potential shareholders 
reasonable assurance that management’s financial statements are free from material misstatements (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Investors therefore value the audit report as a means of improving financial information 
reported by companies.  
Kedia and Philippon (2008), McNichols and Stubben (2008), and other studies on the consequences of 
earnings management have focused exclusively on stock price effects related to the earnings misrepresentation. 
Research has examined earnings management around specific corporate events such as IPOs, management 
buyouts, stock repurchases, and stock for stock acquisitions, and how ex-ante EM activities relates to observed 
post event abnormal stock returns.  
In addition to examining post event stock returns, previous studies have also examined short-term capital 
market reactions around the announcements of fraudulent reporting. Evidence from studies by Foster (1979), 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Beneish (1997), and Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) indicate 
that the market reaction to disclosure of manipulation is on average negative. This implies that investors were 
surprised and interpret these as negative news. 
One of the very first studies to investigate issues related to earning quality was conducted by Wilson (1987) 
of Harvard University. Wilson’s key conclusions were that operating cash flows and total accruals (i.e. change 
in current accruals plus non-current accruals) are differentially valued and that both are value relevant. That is, 
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the market appears to react to the disclosure of detailed cash flow and accrual data (value relevance) and that 
cash flows are more highly valued than accruals (value differential). Wilson’s basic findings are also supported 
by a number of subsequent studies, including Rayburn (1986), Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1987), Chariton 
and Ketz (1990), Livnat and Zarowin (1990), Ali (1994), Pfeiffer, Elgers, Lo and Rees (1998), and Vickrey, and 
Bettis (2000). 
Recent studies have shown that managers with large stock options portfolios are more likely to manipulate 
earnings measured by accruals in Bergstresser and Philippon (2002), and restatements in Burns and Kedia 
(2004), and that they succeed in manipulating stock prices and in making money on concurrent insider trading 
(Beneish & Vargus, 2002). However, Healy and Wahlen (1999) also point to a crucial question that the 
academic research has left unanswered: what is the effect of EM on the allocation of resources?  
The fact that the market values a Naira of cash flow more than a Naira of current or non-current accruals 
implies that higher levels of accruals are indicative of lower quality of earnings. In other words, the degree to 
which a company must rely on accruals to boost net income results in lower quality of earnings. However, the 
first studies to investigate this issue (Sloan, 1996 and Swanson & Vickrey, 1997) found that, contrary to the 
efficient market hypothesis, disaggregating earnings into cash flow and accrual components is useful in 
identifying securities that are likely to outperform (or under-perform) in the future. Thus, the results of these 
studies imply that security prices do not fully reflect the information contained in the cash flow and accrual 
components of earnings. 
Following in the path of Sloan (1996) as well as Swanson and Vickrey (1997), academic researchers are 
currently focusing on the development of simple empirical models that objectively assess earnings quality in 
order to predict future return performance. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, (2001) found that companies with 
relatively high levels of accruals tend to under-perform while companies with relatively low level of accruals 
tend to outperform for periods of 12-36 months after the disclosure of detailed financial data. Specifically, the 
study found that the return spread between stocks with the highest level of accruals (lowest earnings quality) 
and the lowest level of accruals (highest earnings quality) is as high as 21.7% depending on the approach used 
by the authors in forming portfolios. The implications are that measures of earnings quality can be used in 
forming profitable investment and trading strategies and more effectively manage risk. 
Prior studies (Burgstahler & Dichow, 1997) focus directly on income smoothing, and find that firms 
manage earnings to meet analyst expectations and avoid losses and earnings decreases. Benefits from smoothed 
earnings include a perception of lower risk and a consequent reduced cost of capital, and by extension a high 
market price perception. Evidently, a variety of EM definitions exist but in the context of this study, EM defines 
the planning and execution of certain activities aimed at manipulating and smoothening income and achieving 
high earnings with a view to influencing the company’s stock price (Revsine, 1991). 
Certain exogenous factors may impact on market price per share of a company. Such control variables 
examined in this study include Market to Book Value (MBV) of Equity, Operating Cash Flow (OCF), Leverage 
(LEV), and Company Size (Coysize). 
 
2.2.1 Market to Book Value (MBV) of Equity  
The Market-to-Book Value of equity ratio is one possibility of influence on the earnings and earnings 
manipulations of companies. The effect which this factor might have on the earnings is supportive of its 
inclusion in the estimation model as a control variable. A company’s market-to-book value is a proxy for growth 
opportunities and may affect earnings and equity values (Zhou & Elder, 2001). The factor is the discrepancy or 
difference between market capitalization and accounting book numbers of a company. The discrepancy (or gap) 
describes the extent to which undisclosed and hidden assets are reported. A high MBV ratio is indicative of the 
degree of a company’s market over-valuation in relation to its book values.    
2.2.2 Operating Cash Flow (OCF) 
It is hypothesised that companies with high cash flows (and hence, probable high profits) engage in income-
decreasing abnormal accruals to smooth earnings. Becker, et al, (1998) find that cash flow has a negative 
association with discretionary accruals. Indirect measurement approach is taken for all years, subtracting net 
income before extraordinary items from total accruals to derive OCF before deflating it by prior year assets. This 
is a   performance measure (Dechow et al, 1995; Yang (1999). CFO is introduced to control for potential 
misspecifications in the models (Bauwhede et al, 2000). A negative coefficient on this variable is expected. 
2.2.3 Leverage (LEV) 
Prior research suggests that leverage might be associated with earnings response and market value of equity 
(Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Evidence from literature indicates that managers indulge in 
income - inflating accruals to delay or avoid the costs of debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
Consistent with Becker, et al. (1998), a measure of leverage (LEV) is included to control for the possible effects 
of gearing on earnings and market value of equity. A positive relationship is expected between market value per 
share and leverage (LEV). The debt-to-equity hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) suggests that high 
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leverage works as an incentive for income-increasing manipulations. Leverage is introduced to control for the 
effect of this in highly levered companies. This was also amplified by Becker et al (1998) who asserts that 
leverage can be a proxy for potential income-increasing manipulations in companies suffering from financial 
distress. 
 
2.2.4 Company Size (Coysize) 
The political cost (size) hypothesis suggests that larger companies with more political visibility prefer 
income decreasing accounting choices (Bauwhede et al, 2000). Client company size estimated by total assets is 
included to control this effect. Theory suggests a negative coefficient. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
Essentially, agency theory, signaling theory, and auditors’ theory of inspired confidence justify the key 
function of auditing as a mechanism for mitigating information asymmetries among related parties. The demand 
for audit of companies’ accounts is created by the agency problems which are related to the separation of 
corporate ownership from control (Eilifsen and Messier, 2000; Gerayli, et al, 2011). The agency problem arises 
from the existence of asymmetric information in the principal – agent contracts (Jenson and Messier, 2000). 
Some studies (Trueman and Titman, 1988; Dye, 1988; Schipper, 1989; Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995) have 
shown that the existence of information asymmetry between corporate management and company shareholders is 
a necessary condition for and easy perpetration of earnings misreporting and financial statements manipulations. 
The audit of a company’s accounts is a monitoring or control mechanism that diminishes information asymmetry 
and protects the interests of the principal. 
The auditors’ theory of inspired confidence offers a linkage between the users’ requirement for credible and 
reliable financial reports and the capacity of the audit processes to meet those needs. It sees through the 
development of these needs of the public (stakeholders) and the audit processes over time. Developed by the 
Limperg Institute in Netherlands in 1985, the theory of inspired confidence states that the auditor, as a 
confidential agent, derives his broad function in society from the need for expert and independent examination as 
well as the need for an expert and independent judgement supported by the examinations. Thus, accountants and 
auditors are expected to know and realize that the public continues to expect a low rate of audit failures. This 
requires that the auditors must plan and perform their audit in a manner that will minimize the risk of undetected 
material misstatements. The accountant is under a duty to conduct his work in a manner that does not betray the 
confidence which he commands (Limperg Institue, 1985).  
The import of the theory of inspired confidence is that the duties and responsibilities of the auditors are a 
derivation from the confidence that are bestowed by the public on the success of the audit process and the 
assurance which the opinion of the accountant conveys. Since this confidence determines the existence of the 
process, a betrayal of the confidence logically means a termination of the process or function. Carmichael (2004) 
in discussing the social significance of the audit stated that when the confidence that society has in the 
effectiveness of the audit process and the audit report is misplaced, the value relevance of that audit is destroyed. 
Therefore, auditors are expected to maintain reasonable quality assurance especially given that an audit failure is 
effectively a career-ending event. Audit provides assurance to the owners and management of companies and to 
investors and stakeholders, and along with financial reporting, corporate governance and regulations, supports 
confidence in the capital markets. 
Signaling through auditor choice stands on the agency theory, and is a manner by which managers and/or 
directors may impart to the market additional information about their company and their own behaviour. 
Signaling theory suggests that companies with good performance use financial information disclosure to send 
signals to the market. Craven and Marston (1999), show that firms will attempt to accept the same level of 
disclosure as similar firms operating in the same industry since if a firm does not keep up with the same level of 
disclosure as others, it may be perceived by stakeholders that it is hiding bad news or negative information. As 
the types of financial statements produced have become standardized, potential information differentiation that a 
company can use to send a signal to the market through its financial statements is reduced. Companies are thus 
provided an incentive to signal, other than through transparency in their notes to the accounts and other 
voluntary disclosures, through their choice of auditor. Moreover, even voluntary disclosures that may be used as 
signals achieve enhanced credibility in the presence of a quality auditor.  
A high quality audit sends a signal to the market that the financial statements are more credible than those 
audited by lower quality auditors. The market perceives audit firm size and specialist auditors to be of a higher 
quality than others and rewards (punishes) companies with larger improvements (or falls) in share prices 
accordingly (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Krishnan & Yang, 1999; Menon and Williams, 1994).  
Signaling theory does not actually require higher audit quality, it merely needs the market to believe that 
Top Tier firms are associated with higher audit quality because of the fee premiums they are able to command 
(Moizer, 1997). It has been shown that the market’s perception of the quality of the company’s auditor 
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influences that company’s share price. As such, directors and management may want to signal to the 
stakeholders that their interest is being well monitored. Therefore, signaling should, theoretically, affect the 
demand for audit quality over and beyond the monitoring function alone. The positive Signal of transparency and 
credibility it sends to the market and the assurance it provides to stakeholders about the quality of earnings 
performance disclosures suggests a positive association between MPS and audit quality.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Secondary data obtained from a sample of 57 quoted companies are studied out of the non – financial firms 
quoted on the NSE over a period of six years from 2006 to 2011 resulting in 342 company accounting – year 
observations. Archival data were extracted from annual reports and accounts of the selected companies.  
Drawing from the foregoing analysis, literature provides the conceptual and theoretical bases for the 
development and construction of the following propositions: 
H0: Audit Quality does not significantly influence the Market Prices of Shares of Quoted Companies in  
Nigeria 
 
3.1 Estimation of Audit Quality 
The major proposition of this study is that market price per share of companies depends on audit quality and 
we maintain that this study extends the audit quality proxy of Audit Firm Size (AFS) to include other perceived 
audit quality proxies in line with Heniger (20010); Ebrahim, (2001); Piot and Janin (2005); Gerayli, et al (2011). 
In this study, we estimate audit quality by isolating each of the most commonly applied surrogates as follows:  
 
1. Audit Firm Size in terms of Big-4 and Non-Big-4 audit firms (DeAngelo, 1981; Deis & Giroux, 1992; 
Becker et al, 1998; Francis & Krishnan, 1999; Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; Kim, Chung & Firth, 2003 and 
Krishnan, 2003);  
2. Audit Fees which also measures Auditor Independence (Palmrose, 1986, 1988; Moizer, 1997; Wooten, 
2003; Craswel, Stokes, & Laughton,  2002);   
3. Auditor Tenure (Knapp, 1991; Lys & Watts, 1994; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Frankel et al, 2002; 
Myers, Myers & Omer, 2003; Pigé, 2000; Ebrahim, 2001); and  
4. Audit Client Importance (Heninger, 2001; Ebrahim, 2001).  
 
We treat the individual variable effects as well as the effects of using all the audit quality attributes together 
in line with Heninger (2001), Ebrahim (2001), Piot and Janin, 2005, and Gerayli et al (2011). Using a number of 
explanatory variables after controlling for the effects of exogenous variables on the dependent variable is 
authenticated by Thierauf and Klekamp (1975: 20) who posit that “a general model which will be representative 
of a system under study takes the form of E = f (X1, X2, … Xn, Y1,Y2, … Yn)”. Where: E = objective function; 
X1, X2 … Xn = system variables that are subject to control (controllable variables); Y1, Y2 … Yn = system 
variables that are not subject to control (uncontrollable variables). The measurement and construct validity of all 
the variables and the specific review of the various proxies for estimating audit quality are contained in table 3.1 
below. 
 
3.2 Derivation of Market Price per Share (MPS) 
Market Price per share (MPS) of each of the 57 companies were obtained directly from www.cashcraft.com 
as at the end of the year. “Cash craft” is a unit of the Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS) in Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. 
 
3.3 Model Specifications 
In this section considers the models used to deal with the effects and relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables contained in the hypotheses. Some prior studies (Becker et al, 1998; Bauwhede et al, 
2000) that used only one audit quality attribute to measure audit quality observed that the use of only one 
attribute when other perceived attributes are known to have effect on audit quality is an obvious limitation to 
their findings. In order to correct for the effects of such constraints on the results, Heninger, (2001), Ebrahim 
(2001), Piot and Janin (2005), Gerayli et al, (2011) used a number of identified perceived audit quality attributes 
together. Following this latter approach, and taking cognizance of the problem of multicollinearity that such 
treatment could create, we develop a set of models for each of the two relationships to include a number of  
identified relevant audit quality measures after running some regression assumption tests including tests of 
normality, multicollinearity, Heteroscedaticity, autocorrelation and model specification tests.  
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This study modifies Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model and was used to test for the effect and relationship 
between audit quality and Share prices of quoted companies in Nigeria. Ohlson (1995) model was adopted by 
Amir (1996), Amir and Lev (1996) and Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997). This present study applies the 
Ohlson (1995) model modified to include multiple audit quality variables as well as control variables. Linear 
regression analyses were used to test the relationship between the dependent variable (MPS) and the identified 
independent audit quality measurement variables. Eq. 3.5 relates the most commonly used audit quality 
attributes, AFS, AF, AT and ACI to MPS as separate individual independent variables. 
 
MPSi,t = a0 + β1AFSi,t + β2SAi,t + β3AFi,t + β4ATi,t + β5ACIi,t + β6CFOi,t + β7CoySizei,t + 
β8Gwthi,t + β9Levi,t +  β10EPSi,t + β11BVPSi,t +ei,t   ------------------------------------------- (eq.3.5) 
 
Where:   
MPSi,t   = Market Price per share for company i at time t obtained from CSCS cash  craft page using       
    www.cashcraft.com  
EPSi,t   = Company i reported EPS before extraordinary items for period t. 
BVPSi,t  = Company i book value of equity per share at time t estimated as net total assets divided by the number 
of Ordinary shares for each of the companies. Other variables remain as described table 3.1 below. 
 
TABLE 3.1: MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
4. DATA ANALYSES 
This section contains the presentation, analyses and interpretation of the data collected for the study. The 
estimation models are examined empirically and used to test the causal-relationships between market price per 
share and audit quality. Descriptive statistics, regression assumption tests (for the variables) and multiple 
regression analyses were conducted on the data. For purpose of comparison, the sensitivity of the endogenous 
variables was examined on the baseline equation containing multiple proxies of audit quality in line with 
Heninger (2001), Ebrahim (2001), Piot and Janin (2005), Gerayli et al (2011). The regression analyses were 
conducted using the Pooled OLS and the Panel OLS. A series of statistical tests incorporating both the Hausman 
Test and the Panel Unit Root tests were performed on the data.  The analyses and results are presented below.  
 
 
 
 
S/N Variables Definitions Type 
 
Measurement 
 
Construct validity source 
1 MPS 
Market Price per 
share 
Dependent 
Obtained directly from CSCS 
at www.cashcraft.com  
Ohlson, (1995); Amir (1996); Collins, 
maydew and Weiss (1997). 
2 AFS Audit Firm Size Independent 
Dichotomous: ‘1’ if company 
is audited by a Big4, ‘0’ 
otherwise 
DeAngelo, 1981; Deis and Giroux, 1992; 
Becker et al, 1998; Francis and Krishnan, 
1999; Krishnan and Schauer, 2000;  and 
Krishnan, 2003  
3 AF 
A measure of 
Auditor 
Independence 
 
,, 
Natural Log of the Audit Fees 
Paid by the company. 
Palmrose, 1988, Copley (1991), Frankel et 
al, 2002; Li & Lin, 2005; Gerayli et al, 2011 
4 AT Audit Tenure ,, 
Length of auditor-client 
relationship: ‘1’ if 3 yrs
+
 & ‘0’ 
if otherwise. 
Heninger ( 2001); Ebrahim (2001)   
5 ACI 
Degree of Audit 
Client Importance 
to the Audit Firm 
,, 
%  of Turnover of  each 
company to Total Turnover of 
Clients of the auditor within 
the sample size 
Heninger ( 2001), Ebrahim (2001) 
6 CFO 
Cash Flow From 
Operations 
Control 
CFO as % of Total Assets at 
end of Year  ‘t’. 
Adapted from Dechow et al (1995); Yang 
(1999); Bauwhede et al (2000). 
7 Gwth 
Growth Prospects 
of the Company 
,, 
(Market Value divided by  
Book Value of Equity) = 
MPS/BVPS    
Zhou and Elder (2001); Bowen, et al (2005)  
8 CoySize Company Size ,, 
Natural log of company Total 
Assets 
Bauwhede et al, 2000; Gerayli et al, 2011 
9 Lev. Leverage ,, 
Total Debts 
Equity 
Becker et al (1998), Watts & Zimmerman, 
(1986) 
10 EPS Earnings per Share 
,, 
As reported in the Annual 
Financial statements of 
sampled companies 
Ohlson, (1995); Amir (1996); Collins, 
maydew and Weiss (1997). 
11 BVPS 
Book value of 
equity per share 
,, Net Operating Assets 
No. of Ord. Shares 
Ohlson, (1995); Amir (1996); Collins, 
maydew and Weiss (1997). 
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4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum Std.Dev Jarque-Bera Probability 
MPS 37.92732 14.2 445.66 0.5 61.43473 2415.146 0.000 
AFS 0.702771 1 1 0 0.457615 76.42107 0.000 
AF 6.821742 6.9 8.22 5.04 0.577794 16.92742 0.000 
AT 0.942065 1 1 0 0.233914 3459.362 0.000 
ACI 5.536801 1 54.63 0.01 9.839493 1723.826 0.000 
CFO 11.66365 11.7 99.49 -126.16 16.67328 3494.981 0.000 
GWTH 8.667909 2.7 1228.33 -24.64 72.64753 922498.7 0.000 
COSIZE 9.879723 9.97 11.66 7.87 0.790002 10.88827 0.004 
LEV 5.505743 1.39 685.82 -15.7 43.15786    696687 0.000 
EPS 1.995959 0.755 30.23 -9.31 3.587965 3123.311 0.000 
BVPS 9.415491 4.11 506.74 -43.19 27.37497 1248657 0.000 
Source: computation derived from Eviews 7.0 by the author 
 
4.2 Multiple Regression Tests  
In this section we test the robustness of our main results by modifying some aspects of the estimated 
equations. The Robustness Tests were conducted to examine the sensitivity of the endogenous variable in the 
baseline equation that contains multiple proxies for audit quality in line with Ebrahim (2001), Heninger  (2001), 
Piot and Janin (2005), Gerayli et al (2011). Firstly, we begin by testing if the coefficients of the variables are 
sensitive to the inclusion of all the explanatory variables (Audit quality measures) together in the model.  
  
4.2.1 Regression Assumption Tests 
Table 4.1 has revealed that the p-values associated with Jarque-Bera statistics for the variables are all less than 
0.05 indicating the normality of data and suitability for generalization. It also suggests the absence of outliers in 
the data. Table 4.2 presents the regression assumptions tests. 
 
Table 4.2 Regression Assumptions Test for Model  
Variance inflation test for Multicollinearity 
Coefficient Centered 
Variable Variance VIF 
   
C 1735.123  NA 
AFS 36.936 1.496 
AF 93.473 5.448 
AT 145.039 1.153 
ACI 0.101 1.953 
CFO 0.022 2.859 
GWTH 0.003 2.859 
COSIZE 82.294 9.831 
LEV 
EPS 
BVPS 
0.005 
0.898 
0.083 
2.079 
2.079 
2.164 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 31.031 Prob. F(1,182) 0.000 
Obs*R-squared 28.903 Prob. Chi-
Square(1) 
0.000 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  
F-statistic 5.739 Prob. F(9,184) 0.004 
Obs*R-squared 10.853 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.004 
     
Ramsey RESET Test  
  
 Value  Probability  
t-statistic 0.862159  0.3895  
F-statistic 0.743318  0.3895  
Likelihood ratio 0.777317  0.378  
Source: Computation derived from Eview 7.0 by the author. * VIF exceeding or approximating to 10. 
 
Table 4.2 above shows the regression assumptions test for the estimation model. As shown in the table, 
non of the variables has a VIF value exceeding 10 and hence all the variables are upheld in the regression model. 
The performance of the Ramsey RESET test showed high probability values that were greater than 0.05, 
meaning that there was no significant evidence of misspecification. The Breusch-pagan-Godfrey test for 
heteroscedasticity was performed on the residuals and the results showed probabilities less than 0.05, which 
suggest the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. As one appropriate method of treating 
heteroskedasticity, Robust Standard Errors was adopted to addresses the issue of errors that are not independent 
and identically distributed. In addition we also utilize the Estimated General Least Squares (ELGS) in 
conducting the panel OLS.  
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation indicates that the probabilities (Prob. F, Prob. 
Chi-Square) were less than 0.05, suggesting the presence of serial correlation in the model. In correcting for 
serial correlation in the model we adopt the Cochrane Orcutt method which includes an autoregressive (AR) 
term as part of the exogenous variables and re-estimating the model (Eviews, 7.0). However, in the case of panel 
data (with effects) where the inclusion of AR terms is not allowed, the EGLS (Estimated General Least Squares) 
was applied.  
Table 4.3a Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test 
Table 4.3b Breitung Unit Root Test 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified maximum lags     
Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 3   
Method   Statistic Prob.**   
Breitung t-stat  -7.22855 0.000   
Source: Computation derived from Eview 7.0 by the author 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags    
Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 14  
Method   Statistic Prob.**   
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 570.45 0.000   
ADF - Choi Z-stat  -17.2136 0.000   
       ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi – square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality.  
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Table 4.3c Im, Pesaran and Shin unit root test 
           
Table 4.3a, b & c above provide summary reports of panel unit root tests on the residuals of the regressions. The p-
values reported in Table 4.3a suggest that the hypothesis of no unit root can be rejected at least at the 5% level.  Also, 
the ADF Fisher statistic (570.45) and the Choi Z-stat. (-17.214) for the stacked residuals indicate that the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is strongly rejected. In addition, the Breitung Unit Root Test is performed and the 
results shows that the Breitung t-stat (-7.2286) and p-value (0.00) as presented in table 4.3b suggest that the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is strongly rejected at 5%. The Im, Pesaran and Shin unit root test was performed as an 
additional check to confirm the stationarity of the data. The results shows that the Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (-
109.105) and p-value (0.000) as presented in table 4.3c suggest that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is strongly 
rejected at 5%. Unit root testing is important for identifying if the residuals from the individual cross sections do not 
contain a unit root which suggests that there exists an equilibrium (stable) relationship that keeps the relevant 
variables in the models in proportion to one another in the long run. With the stationarity condition of the series 
determined, the regression analysis was conducted based on the confidence and high probability of non-spurious 
results.  
 
4.2.2 Multiple Regression Tests  
Table 4.4 Multiple Regression test 
                                   POOLED OLS   PANEL OLS (NO EFFECTS)    PANEL OLS (FIXED EFFECTS) 
Variable Coefficient  Prob.                  Coefficient    Prob.                 Coefficient      Prob 
C 7.73  0.759                4.017            0.893                             66.92           0.000* 
EXPLANATORY 
ACI 
VARIABLES 
0.459 
  
0.166                 0.455           0.217                            -1.848            0.249 
AF -13.046  0.049*            -10.745         0.000*                          -2.371            0.043* 
AFS 14.914  0.003*               13.436         0.000*                          -1.399            0.404 
AT 3.139  0.638                 2.671            0.592                             1.321            0.343 
CONTROL 
CFO 
VARIABLES 
-0.139 
  
0.262               -0.142           0.198                             -0.015            0.433 
GWTH 0.058  0.010*             0.059           0.000*                           0.180             0.045* 
COYSIZE                                                8.243                                  0.067**     7.060           0.000*                          -1.450             0.024* 
LEV -0.039  0.158            -0.038           0.177                           -0.284             0.083** 
R
2
 0.696  0.70                                                  0.877              
ADJ R
2
                            0.682                        0.69                                                  0.839 
F-Stat 53.44                 65.5                                                  23.58             
P(f-stat) 
D.W 
0.00 
1.2 
                0.00                                                  0.000 
                1.2                                                   2.03           
Source: Computation derived from Eview 7.0 by the author. * significant at 5% **significant at 10% 
 
4.8 Discussion of Results  
In estimating the models, we employed the pooled OLS and Panel effects estimations. Our preference for 
the variable estimates used in discussing the results is based on the descriptive statistic and Hausman (1978) 
Test. Descriptive statistics showed the mean value of Audit firm Size (0.702) and suggests that majority of the 
companies in the sample were audited by the Big-4 Audit Firms. This may be related to the level of perceived 
audit firm quality being associated with Audit Firm Size (in terms of the Big-4 audit brand names) by quoted 
companies in Nigeria. This result agrees with the findings of previous studies (DeAngelo, 1981; Copley, 1991; 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)    
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends  
User-specified maximum lags      
Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 3    
Method     Statistic  Prob.** 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat    -109.105  0.000 
 
Source: Computation Derived from Eviews 7.0 
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Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Becker, et al, 1998; Bauwhede et al, 2000; Zhou and Elder, 2001; Krishnan, 2003). 
Other prior studies agree on audit quality as a function of audit firm size and demonstrate that larger (Big 8, Big 
6, Big 5 or Big 4) audit firms possess greater capacity to constrain and minimise earnings misstatements 
(Palmrose, 1988; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Krishnan and Schauer, 2000; Kim, Chung 
and Firth, 2003). Our result shows a considerable cluster of audit firm choice around the Big-4 audit brand 
names. 
The descriptive statistics also reveal that on the average, companies (about 94%) engage their audit firms for 
over three (3) years. The study reveals a considerable experience of a substantial number of audit firms in this 
distribution. Audit Tenure is defined in this study as the length of the auditor-client relationship. In Nigeria, it is 
professionally required that audit tenure should not exceed three years but this does not appear to be enforced. 
The fixed effects estimation show that the effect of Audit firm size on MPS appear negative   (-0.094) but is 
insignificant (p=0.996) at 5% level.  The effect of Audit fees on MPS is positive (9.514) and significant 
(p=0.078) at 10% level. We also find that the effect of Audit tenure on MPS appeared to be negative (-1.848) but 
is insignificant (p=0.249) at 5% level. With the inclusion of all explanatory variables (Audit quality measures) 
together in the model, the fixed effects estimation shows that while only Audit tenure appear to impact positively 
on MPS (1.321), it is insignificant (0.343); ACI is negative (-1.848) and insignificant (-0.249); AF is negative (-
2.371) and significant, AFS is negative (-1.399) but insignificant (0.404). Only AF proves to be significant at 5% 
(p=0.043). The results of the tests by both Single Audit Quality explanatory variables taken individually as well 
as multiple Audit Quality measures taken together indicate that, in relation to MPS, only Audit Fees (AF) is 
significant at 5%.  
This result seems to move along the direction of Auditor expertise hypothesis. In line with this hypothesis, 
some prior studies have shown that larger Audit Firms receive larger audit fees than smaller audit firms 
(Palmrose, 1986; Copley, 1991; Wooten, 2003), and on the basis of this, AF is significantly related to audit 
quality (Moiser, 1997). Although, this evidence provides the basis to reject the null hypothesis (H0) and uphold 
the alternative hypothesis showing that Audit Quality exerts significant influence on the Market Price per Share 
of quoted companies in Nigeria, there are other variables which appear to exert greater influence on MPS of 
quoted companies in Nigeria than Audit Quality. For instance, the examination of the effects of the control 
variables shows that company growth prospects (gwth), company size (coysize) and Leverage have strong 
significant effects on MPS of quoted companies in Nigeria than audit quality.  
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The summary of the above findings is based on results of both the descriptive statistics and the various tests 
conducted on the multiple regression models. The summary of findings is as follows: 
1. The results of the tests on both Single Audit Quality explanatory variables taken individually as well as 
multiple Audit Quality measures taken together show that Audit Quality measures exert significant 
influence on the Market Value per Share of quoted companies in Nigeria.  
2. The result of descriptive statistics imply that majority of the companies in the sample were audited by the 
Big-4 Audit Firms. This may be related to the level of perceived audit firm quality being associated with 
Audit Firm Size (in terms of the Big-4 audit brand names) by quoted companies in Nigeria. 
3. The descriptive statistic test result also revealed that on the average, companies (about 94%) engage their 
audit firms for over three (3) years, with a considerable experience of a substantial number of audit firms 
in this distribution.  
5.2  Policy Implications of Findings 
The policy implications of our findings are as follows:  
1. The reported results and findings of this study present obvious implication for regulators such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in its supervisory position to distinguish between legitimacy, 
outright fraudulent reporting and earnings statements that reflect the desires of management rather than 
the underlying performance of the company and to impose appropriate disciplinary penalties on offenders. 
2. The result of this study has shown that if company’s earnings are not properly monitored, companies will 
continue to deviate from reporting correct earnings figures by presenting earnings figures that appear 
beautiful but are not true; hence investors and other stake holders are deceived. 
3. The Auditors standing expertise notwithstanding, an overly long association between the auditor and his 
client may constitute a threat to independence and hence audit quality as personal ties and familiarity may 
develop between the parties. This will lead to less vigilance and an obliging attitude of the auditor towards 
the top managers of the company. Apart from the threat to independence and audit quality, the audit 
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engagement may become routine over time resulting in devotion of less effort to identifying the 
weaknesses of internal control and risk sources.  
 
5.3  Recommendations 
This study recommends that: 
1. The management of quoted companies in Nigeria should, as a legal mandate, provide a “statement of the 
quality of its earnings” arrived at using acceptable and uniform criteria and make assertions that the 
earnings of the company have not been manipulated (managed) during the period. Management can be 
held liable for any misstatement intended to distort or mislead the public with respect to the “quality of 
earnings”. Management should be responsible for making an assertion about the company’s quality of 
earnings, similar to the financial statement assertions currently required.  
2. The auditors of quoted companies in Nigeria should conduct Earnings Quality Assessment (EQA) 
following typical earnings manipulation detection metrics and issue “Integrated Audit Reports” which 
will include EQA reports and Internal Control Reports in addition to normal annual audit reports. EQA 
reports will provide higher – quality information to financial statement users and meet the Stock 
Exchange, Regulatory Agencies and the public demand for greater assurance about the reliability of 
earnings figures. The conduct and completion of the EQA should be a legislative mandate while the 
auditors should be held responsible for EQA report they issue. Auditors’ insight and expertise in this area 
is much like the expertise required to evaluate and report on management’s assessment of internal controls 
under section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002).  
3. The three years professional requirement for Auditors in Nigeria should be backed up by law and 
enforced. Considering the negative effects audit tenure may have on audit quality of independence 
(measured by audit fee in this study) and in line with global trends, professional accounting bodies, 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, and the National Assembly should issue a codified and 
authoritative framework, guideline or standard for auditors’ tenure and independence in Nigeria.  
4. Attention should also be focused on companies’ attempts to smooth or increase earnings to beautify its 
attractions in the stock market through unnecessary manipulation of real economic operations and cash 
flows. We recommend that companies earn high quality income only through sales growth and cost 
reduction activities since repeatable and fairly predictable earnings that come from sales and cost 
reductions presents the company’s earnings as high quality earnings in the eyes of investors.         
5. Audit quality measures applied to effectively detect and report earnings misstatements will facilitate the 
achievement of the public expected low rate of audit failures. This implies that Auditors must plan and 
perform their audit procedures in a manner that will minimize the risk of an undetected material 
misstatement.  
6. In order to enhance high Audit Quality and minimize earnings misrepresentation, Companies in Nigeria 
should adapt to or engage in an outright adoption of currently available best practices like the provisions 
of US Public Companies Accounting Oversight (Sarbanes Oxley’s) Act, 2002 and Public Companies 
Accounting Oversight Board standards, the UK Financial Reporting Council’s Audit Quality Guidelines 
and Frameworks, followed by a statutorily backed earnings monitoring of companies in Nigeria. 
7. Further studies in the same or similar areas to the present study should focus firstly on quoted companies 
in the financial services sector, and secondly on the unquoted companies and other businesses located 
within the informal sector in Nigeria. Despite the reasons adduced, the non-inclusion of institutions in 
these sectors is a major constraint to generalization of results and findings as the financial data for such 
firms also need to be evaluated in order to be able to make general policies that will favourably affect 
such institutions and consequently the entire economy.  
5.4 Conclusion 
Many past empirical studies investigate the implications of audit quality since the seminar work of 
DeAngelo (1981). The majority of these investigations are based on developed economies, while very little is 
empirically known about the implications, relationships and impact of audit quality on market prices of equity in 
transition economies like Nigeria. Based on a sample of 342 company – year observations from the NSE for the 
fiscal years, 2006 to 2011, and using the commonly applied audit quality measures (AFS, AF, AT and ACI) 
separately before treating them together, for purpose of comparison, a massive and all-inclusive multivariate 
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analyses was conducted. The result showed that audit quality significantly exerts influence and relationships with 
market prices of quoted companies in Nigeria. 
Although the results of this study are similar to findings of some similar studies conducted in some more 
advanced economies, in arriving at the above conclusions, quoted financial institutions, unquoted companies and 
other firms located within the informal sector of the Nigerian economy were excluded; the sample covered six 
years of data drawn from annual accounts of sampled companies. The effect of these limitations is that external 
validity problem may be amplified to constrain the generalization of the results to cover different periods of time 
and different locations. The effects of inflation on figures related to financial statements and on the market value 
of equity of quoted companies in Nigeria were ignored.    
In Nigeria in particular and to the best of our knowledge, as at the time of this present study, only a scanty 
number of studies may have examined the effects of audit quality on the market prices of shares of quoted non-
financial institutions in Nigeria. This study therefore, contributes to knowledge by showing that the best 
accounting policy is that which evokes the greatest market response and the market seems to respond to earnings 
information more strongly than other information contained in financial statements. Audit Quality can act as a 
signal to potential earnings announcement and elicit the reactions or response of investors to the market price of 
the company’s shares. This study is one of the few studies that have related audit quality directly to market value 
of equity per share. Furthermore, this study contributes to knowledge by integrating three streams of research in 
market reactions, share prices and audit quality which has been desperate and incongruent in the past and/or in 
other economies. 
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